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Humans often make decisions in stressful situations, for example when the stakes are high and the
potential consequences severe, or when the clock is ticking and the task demand is overwhelming. In
response, a whole train of biological responses to stress has evolved to allow organisms to make a ﬁght-
or-ﬂight response. When under stress, fast and effortless heuristics may dominate over slow and
demanding deliberation in making decisions under uncertainty. Here, I review evidence from behavioral
studies and neuroimaging research on decision making under stress and propose that stress elicits a
switch from an analytic reasoning system to intuitive processes, and predict that this switch is associated
with diminished activity in the prefrontal executive control regions and exaggerated activity in
subcortical reactive emotion brain areas. Previous studies have shown that when stressed, individuals
tend to make more habitual responses than goal-directed choices, be less likely to adjust their initial
judgment, and rely more on gut feelings in social situations. It is possible that stress inﬂuences the
arbitration between the emotion responses in subcortical regions and deliberative processes in the
prefrontal cortex, so that ﬁnal decisions are based on unexamined innate responses. Future research may
further test this ‘stress induced deliberation-to-intuition’ (SIDI) model and examine its underlying neural
mechanisms.
© 2016 The Author. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Contents
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and it's the time when they most need to think.
Bill Clinton
1. Introduction
Stressful situations are not uncommon in everyday life, experi-
enced for example by a doctor in the emergency room, a police
ofﬁcer in action, or a ﬁnancial trader on a London trading ﬂoor.
Individuals sometimes need tomake important decisions when the
stakes are high and when not enough information or cognitive
resources are available to guarantee a sound choice. However, the
high pressure may dramatically change decision making strategies,
leading to different choices than would be made without such
pressure. For example, individuals may approach situations differ-
ently depending onwhether decisions are easy to makewithout far
reaching consequences or life-altering and ambiguous. Although it
is vital to understand decision making under stress, the majority of
previous studies on decision making are carried out in non-
stressful contexts. Only recent years have witnessed a remarkable
burgeoning of decision-making research related to stress. But many
ﬁndings in this ﬁeld are mixed, leaving the speciﬁc effects of stress
on judgment and decision making relatively unclear. The purpose
of the current review is to summarize evidence from both human
and animal studies on decisions under stress and to elucidate the
neurobiological mechanisms underlying strategy shifting in the
context of stress induced decision making.
Theories on decision making have proposed that there are two
routes tomaking decisions: a fast route labeled System 1 and a slow
route labeled System 2 (Kahneman, 2011; Evans, 2008; Gilovich
et al., 2002; Evans & Stanovich, 2013). System 1 operates quickly
and automatically with little effort. It activates our innate and
instinctive responses to stimuli. For example, whenever a snake is
detected or believed to be out there, instinctive fear is aroused and
avoidance behavior is initiated without much thought. Such
genetically hard-wired responses can enhance our ability to cope
with vital environmental challenges of the type experienced during
most of human history. Prolonged practice and experience also
produce involuntary actions or habits. On the other hand, System 2
runs slowly and in an effortful manner, requiring complex
computation. The pros and cons associated with each option are
calculated and compared until an optimal choice can be made.
Comparing both systems, System 2 is thought to be an evolution-
arily more recent system and can ﬂexibly check, modify, and
override the decisions from System 1 (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983).
Although evidences showing that stress modulates decision
making is accumulating (Starcke & Brand, 2012; Galvan & Rahdar,
2013; Morgado et al., 2015), there is currently no theoretical
framework to explain why stress should inﬂuence decisions in
certain ways. The evolutionary perspective on stress posits that the
stress response has been shaped by natural selection to increase the
ability of organisms to cope with situations that require action or
defense (Cannon, 1914). When organisms are faced with possible
damage or a loss of resources and a “ﬁght-or-ﬂight” response isrequired, they can express protective features that allow them to
survive adverse conditions and help them mitigate the harmful
effects of environmental stresses (Nesse & Young, 2000). For
example, when under stress, organisms show increases in heart
rate and contractility that speed circulation, increases in the rate
and depth of breathing that speed gas exchange, increased sweat-
ing that cools the body and makes it slippery, increased glucose
synthesis associated with spikes in energy, a shunt of blood from
gut and skin to muscles, and greater muscle tension that increases
strength and endurance (Graham, 1953).
Based on the evolutionary accounts of stress and the dual-system
theories of judgment and decisionmaking, it is reasonable to predict
that stress promotes evolutionarily rooted intuitive responses in
System 1. These intuitive responses are fast and require fewer
cognitive resources to execute than in System 2. In normal situations,
the intuition system may initiate some default action tendency and
the reasoning system checks whether such a tendency is compatible
with the current goals and environment. That is, intuition proposes
ﬁrst and reasoning decides whether to approve or tomodify it. When
under stress, the reasoning system may not check these response
tendencies and instead allow individuals to rely on these rigid
default actions in response to environmental challenges.
Grounded on this ‘intuition proposes, reasoning decides’ type of
dual-system, I propose that when under stress, intuitive responses
may bypass the examination of reasoning and reach the threshold
to become ﬁnal decisions. Thus, stressed individuals may fall back
more on intuition and involve less amounts of conscious reasoning.
Because they are intuitive, automatic processes ought to lead to
premature choices, and stress may exacerbate decision biases via
shifting decision strategies fromdeliberation to intuition, labeled as
“stress induced deliberation-to-intuition” (SIDI). Intuition is a
cognitive process that has multiple layers of meanings and impli-
cations. In the SIDI model, intuition refers to an automatic, habitual,
and evolutionarily based decision making process, corresponding
to System 1. Deliberation refers to System 2, which is a slow, goal-
directed, and reasoning based process. This dual system account
complements the previous theory that stress promotes a shift from
ﬂexible cognitive to rather rigid habit memory systems (Schwabe&
Wolf, 2013). It is also consistent with the idea that stress impairs
prefrontal cortex functions such as working memory and attention
regulation, switching from thoughtful ‘top-down’ control by the
PFC to ‘bottom-up’ control by the amygdala and related subcortical
structures (Arnsten, 2009). Here, I extend these ideas by explicitly
proposing that stress favors intuition versus reasoning in the de-
cision making domain and thus leads to decision biases in some
circumstances. The effects of stress on human behaviors are
multifaceted (Staal, 2004), including long-term memory (Schwabe
& Wolf, 2013; Schwabe et al., 2012; Jo€els et al., 2006), working
memory (Arnsten, 2009), and learning (Jo€els et al., 2006). In this
review, I focus only on the effect of stress on reward-based decision
making in humans and discuss how the existing empirical ﬁndings
support the SIDI hypothesis.
2. Stressors potentiate decision biases
Reward-based decision making refers to the process of
Table 1
Effects of acute and chronic stress on decision making.
Category Study Results Decision-making paradigm
Reward Bogdan & Pizzagalli,
2006
Hyposensitive to reward Signal detection task
Elman et al., 2009 Hyposensitive to reward Wheel of fortuneetype task
Ossewaarde et al.,
2011
Hyposensitive to reward Monetary incentive delay task
Lighthall et al., 2012 Greater reward collection and faster responses in males
Less reward collection and slower responses in females
Balloon analogue risk task
Nikolova et al., 2012 Hyposensitive to reward Number guessing paradigm
Porcelli et al., 2012 Hyposensitive to reward# Card guessing task
Oei et al., 2014 Hyposensitive to reward Masked sexual stimuli
Montoya et al., 2014 Hyposensitive to reward Monetary incentive delay task
Lewis et al., 2014 Hypersensitive to reward magnitude Pavlovian conditioning task
Punishment and
threat
Petzold et al., 2010 Reduced use of negative feedback Probabilistic learning task
Robinson et al., 2013 Increased aversive prediction error signals The “What's in the box?” task
Cavanagh et al., 2011 Better punishment learning Probabilistic learning task
Gullo and Stieger,
2011
Increasing sensitivity to losses Iowa Gambling Task
Roelofs et al., 2007 Vigilant to the angry faces Angry and happy faces task
van Wingen et al.,
2011
Increased reactivity to threat Angry and happy faces task
Akinola and Mendes,
2012
Heightened sensitivity to potential danger Shooting targets task
Jackson et al., 2006 Facilitate fear conditioning in males
Inhibit fear conditioning in females
Fear conditioning
Stark et al., 2006 Facilitate fear conditioning in males
Inhibit fear conditioning in females
Fear conditioning
Tabbert et al., 2010 Enhance fear responses in females Fear conditioning
Merz et al., 2012 No effect on fear conditioning/extinction Fear conditioning
Klucken et al., 2013 Weak gene and stressful life events interaction Fear conditioning
Merz et al., 2013a Facilitate fear conditioning in men and women taking oral contraceptives Fear conditioning
Merz et al., 2013b Impaired fear conditioning in men and facilitated fear conditioning in women taking
oral contraceptives
Fear conditioning
Antov et al., 2013 Attenuate fear conditioning after 2nd wave and facilitate fear conditioning after 1st
wave in men
Fear conditioning
Merz et al., 2014 Attenuates fear retrieval in men Fear conditioning
Risk Preston et al., 2007 Risk seeking in males
Risk averse in females
Iowa gambling task
van den Bos et al.,
2009
Risk seeking in males
U shape in females
Iowa gambling task
Mather et al., 2009 Risk averse in elderly Iowa gambling task
Zhang et al., 2011 Poorer performance only in formerly heroin-dependent patients Iowa gambling task
Starcke et al., 2008 Risk seeking Game of Dice Task
Pabst et al., 2013b Risk seeking Game of Dice Task
Pabst et al., 2013a Reduced reﬂection effect in loss framing Game of Dice task
Gathmann et al., 2014 Risk seeking Game of Dice Task
Lighthall et al., 2009 Risk seeking in males
Risk averse in females
Balloon analogue risk task
Kandasamy et al.,
2014
Risk averse Financial choices in the ﬁeld
Porcelli and Delgado,
2009
Enhanced reﬂection effect Financial decision-making task
Cueva et al., 2015 Risk seeking Asset trading game
Haushofer et al., 2013 No effect on delay discounting Delay discounting task
Cognitive control Raio et al., 2013 Impaired emotion regulation Fear learning
Schwabe and Wolf,
2009
More habitual choices Instrumental learning
Schwabe et al., 2011 More habitual choices Instrumental learning
Dias-Ferreira et al.,
2009*
More habitual choices Instrumental learning
Soares et al., 2012* More habitual choices Instrumental learning
Kassam et al., 2009 More habitual choices Anchor and adjustment task
Maier et al., 2015 More immediate gratiﬁcation Food choice task
Seehagen et al., 2015 More habitual responses in infants Instrumental learning task.
Margittai et al., 2015a More intuitive thinking cognitive reﬂection test
Prosocial tendency Takahashi et al., 2007 Give more Dictator's game
Vinkers et al., 2013 Give less Dictator's game
von Dawans et al.,
2012
Share more Trust game
McGinley et al., 2010 Greater anonymous prosocial tendency
Less costly prosocial tendency
Survey
Starcke et al., 2012 Less utilitarian Moral dilemmas
Youssef et al., 2012 Less utilitarian Moral dilemmas
Starcke et al., 2011 More egoistic Everyday Moral Decision-Making
(continued on next page)
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Table 1 (continued )
Category Study Results Decision-making paradigm
Leder et al., 2013 Reduced emtalizing Beauty contest game
Smeets et al., 2009 Enhanced metalizing in males
Reduced metalizing in females
Movie for the Assessment of Social
Cognition
Margittai et al., 2015b Increased generosity towards close but not distant others Social discounting task
*Animal studies.
#Another possibility is hypersensitivity to punishment.
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options, and choosing a course of action. In the next section, I
summarize the ﬁndings concerning stress and different decision
making components, including the encoding of decision parame-
ters (e.g. reward/punishment processing and risk analysis), execu-
tive control, and social decision making (see Table 1).
2.1. Altered encoding of decision parameters
2.1.1. Reward sensitivity
Weighing positive and negative aspects of decision options is
the ﬁrst important step in decision making. It has been proposed
that stress triggers additional reward salience (STARS), which may
contribute to a stress induced risk preference change (Mather &
Lighthall, 2012). It is argued that because stress sensitizes dopa-
mine release in reward-processing brain regions (Pruessner et al.,
2004), acute stress may enhance selection of previously
rewarding outcomes but impair avoidance of previously negative
outcomes. Indeed, there is some empirical evidence of reward hy-
persensitivity under stress. In one study, cortisol responders in the
stress group, compared to the no stress group, exhibited differential
activity in the ventral striatum to cues predicting high versus low
reward (Lewis et al., 2014). In another, a cold pressor stress
enhanced learning about cues that predicted positive outcomes in
both younger and older adults (Lighthall et al., 2013). It has also
been found that behavioral preference for sexual rewards increased
with long-term cortisol exposure (2 months pre-test cortisol
derived from a hair sample) (Chumbley et al., 2014). However, most
studies have shown that acute stress actually reduces reward
responsiveness. Using the same probabilistic stimulus selection
task (PSST) used in the Lighthall et al. (2013) study, Berghorst et al.
(2013) found that stress induced by threat of shock selectively
reduced reward sensitivity with no inﬂuence on punishment pro-
cessing in highly stress-reactive individuals (Berghorst et al., 2013).
Other research showed that stress induced by threat of shock
impaired reward responsiveness, particularly in individuals with
anhedonic symptoms (Bogdan & Pizzagalli, 2006); regression an-
alyses indicated that self-report measures of anhedonia predicted
stress-induced hedonic deﬁcits even after controlling for anxiety
symptoms (Bogdan & Pizzagalli, 2006). This is consistent with
ﬁndings showing that individuals with posttraumatic stress disor-
der exhibit smaller bilateral striatal activations in response to gains,
which are in turn associated with more self-reported motivational
and social deﬁcits (Elman et al., 2009). Participants under stress
also show decreased differential responses to reward and punish-
ment in the dorsal striatum and OFC (Porcelli et al., 2012). However,
whether such an effect is driven by the reduced sensitivity to
reward, enhanced responses to punishment, or both, remains un-
known. Consistent with these stress studies on reward processing,
in a randomized within-subject design, Montoya et al. found that
administration of a high dose of cortisol (40 mg) down-regulated
activity in the brain regions involved in reward-related behavior
in male participants (Montoya et al., 2014). This study provides
direct evidence that cortisol acts on brain's reward circuit, sug-
gesting that stress may modulate reward processing via cortisol.Gender differences and individuals' temperament are also
important modulators of stress related reward sensitivity and
decision-making. It was found that stress led to greater reward
collection and faster decision speed in males but less reward
collection and slower decision speed in females (Lighthall et al.,
2012). One study on gender showed that psychological stress, eli-
cited by strongly aversive movie clips, resulted in a signiﬁcant
decrease in reward-related responses in the medial prefrontal
cortex (mPFC) without affecting ventral striatal responses in
women (Ossewaarde et al., 2011). Individual differences research
has shown that higher levels of life stress are associated with lower
positive affect for participants with relatively low, but not for those
with high, reward-related ventral striatum reactivity (Nikolova
et al., 2012), and high cortisol levels are related to stronger
ventral striatum activation (Oei et al., 2014).
Taken together, ﬁndings regarding whether stress increases or
decreases reward sensitivity are still mixed. The SIDI account also
does not make a simple prediction regarding the direction of
reward sensitivity changes under stress. Whether stress ampliﬁes
or diminishes reward sensitivity may be task dependent.
2.1.2. Punishment and threat sensitivity
Previous research has shown that individuals tend to strongly
prefer avoiding losses to acquiring gains, known as loss aversion
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). Loss aversion might be the result of
an evolutionary process selecting for the evolutionary most ad-
vantageous risk attitude (McDermott et al., 2008). According to the
SIDI model, which emphasizes evolutionary adaptedness of
decision-making, stress should potentiate loss aversion. In linewith
this idea, it has been found that during times of chronic stress,
glucocorticoids, acting through the amygdala and hippocampus,
promote selective attention to mostly negative precedents and
produce a tendency to ﬁnd threat and risk where none exist (Korte,
2001; Sapolsky, 2000). Thus, stress may facilitate the propensity to
form threat-related associations. Stress also has been shown to
signiﬁcantly increase ventral striatum aversive (but not appetitive)
prediction error signals in a learning task (Robinson et al., 2013).
Amygdala and insula reactivity to biologically salient stimuli were
also exaggerated in a group of combat exposed individuals, sug-
gesting that severe stress exposure sensitizes amygdala and insula
reactivity (vanWingen et al., 2011). Under stress as a result of social
evaluative threat, low trait-level punishment sensitivity was
related to a tendency towards better reward learning and poorer
punishment learning; the opposite pattern was found in highly
punishment sensitive individuals (Cavanagh et al., 2011). Stress has
also been shown to restore decision-making deﬁcits in heavy
drinkers by increasing sensitivity to losses (relative to gains) in the
Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) (Gullo & Stieger, 2011). Only one study
found that stress reduces use of negative feedback in reward-based
learning tasks (Petzold et al., 2010). Interestingly, one study found
that individuals with lower chronic cortisol displayed stronger loss
aversion, whereas individuals with higher endogenous cortisol
weighted losses and gains more equally (Chumbley et al., 2014),
suggesting that cortisol reduces oversensitivity to potential losses.
Thus, in the domain of monetary negative feedback processing, the
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punishment detection, supporting the SIDI account.
Learning that certain environment stimuli predict aversive
outcomes promotes survival in the face of present and future
threats (Maren, 2001). Stress may operate as an orchestrated de-
fense that makes innate ﬁght or ﬂight decisions to help animals
adapt to threat (Cannon, 1932; McNaughton & Corr, 2004).
Consistent with this notion, the SIDI model predicts that stress el-
evates the sensitivity to potential threat in general. Studies with
individuals who underwent extreme stress in everyday life seem to
support this. It was found that in soldiers, combat stress increased
amygdala and insula reactivity to biologically salient stimuli (i.e.
angry and fearful face stimuli) (van Wingen et al., 2011). Such
enhanced vigilance to the angry faces was also found in high
cortisol responders in a sample of healthy volunteers (Roelofs et al.,
2007). Police ofﬁcers who had larger cortisol increases to the social-
stress task subsequently made fewer errors in a threat-related
decision making task in which they were deciding whether or not
to shoot targets, suggesting that stress may exacerbate vigilance for
threat cues (Akinola & Mendes, 2012).
In additional to the primary physiological ﬁght-or-ﬂight re-
sponses to stress for both males and females, it has been proposed
that females respond to stress by engaging in nurturing activities
designed to beneﬁt both mother and offspring (the tending
pattern) and by afﬁliating with social groups to reduce risk (the
befriending pattern) (Taylor et al., 2000; Taylor, 2006). The SIDI
model accords with the ‘tend and befriend’ hypothesis and pro-
poses that stress sharpens threat sensitivity in males in order for
the individuals to get ready to engage in ﬁght-or-ﬂight) and re-
duces threat sensitivity in females to allow for being tending and
befriending. Using the fear conditioning paradigm, several studies
found gender-dependent effects of stress on fear acquisition and
fear extinction. In a typical fear-conditioning procedure, an initially
neutral conditioned stimulus (CS) acquires emotional properties
through predictive pairings with an aversive unconditioned stim-
ulus (US, e.g. an electric shock). During the fear acquisition phase, it
was found that stress led to higher conditioned responses in males
(Zorawski et al., 2005; Zorawski et al., 2006; Jackson et al., 2006;
Merz et al., 2013b; Antov et al., 2013), but impaired conditioned
responses in females (Jackson et al., 2006). Neuroimaging studies
using cortisol application, however, revealed reduced conditioned
responses in men (Stark et al., 2006), but enhanced conditioned
responses in women in several brain structures (Stark et al., 2006;
Tabbert et al., 2010). This discrepancy might be due to the fact that
exogenous cortisol levels may actually inhibit the stress-induced
activation of the hypothalamusepituitaryeadrenal (HPA) axis.
During the extinction phase when no aversive stimulation was
administered, women taking oral contraceptives exhibited higher
conditioned responses than men and women in the luteal phase
(Merz et al., 2012), although no effect of cortisol or sex hormones on
fear acquisition was found in this study (Merz et al., 2012). Stress
impaired the neuronal correlates of fear learning and expression in
men, but facilitated them in oral contraceptiveswomen (Merz et al.,
2013b). During the retrieval phase, exposure to stress attenuated
fear retrieval in healthy men (Merz et al., 2014). Although stressful
life events (SLEs) did not have a main effect on fear conditioning, a
weak 5-HTTLPR genotype by SLEs interaction on fear learning was
found (Klucken et al., 2013). These studies suggest that how stress
modulates fear learning depends on sex, current sex hormone
availability, and genotypes. Taken together, stress seems to boost
learning from negative feedback and threat in general, but it also
exerts ﬁne-tuned modulation on behaviors depending on the
evolutionary demands of male and female Homo sapiens.2.1.3. Risk analysis
Decision makers may fall back on automatized reactions to risk
under the inﬂuence of disruptive stress. Previous research identi-
ﬁed the reﬂection bias, the reversal of risk-attitudewhen the sign of
the outcomes changes (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). This bias em-
phasizes the inconsistency in risk attitude (risk aversion in the
domain of gains but risk seeking in the domain of losses, The SIDI
model predicts that stress ampliﬁes this reﬂection effect since it
might be evolutionally adaptive to change risk preference accord-
ing to domains. Consistent with this prediction, using a novel
ﬁnancial decision-making task combined with ice-cold water
induced stress, it was found that the reﬂection effect was signiﬁ-
cantly increased under stress (Porcelli & Delgado, 2009). Stress
potentially exacerbates behavioral biases in decision-making by
inducing more conservative choices for those who are generally
risk-averse and more risky choices for those who tend to be risk-
seekers. However, using a more complex Game of Dice Task
(GDT), it was found that stress reduced the effect of loss framing,
such that stressed participants showed less risky behavior
comparedwith non-stressed participants (Pabst et al., 2013b). More
studies are needed to further examine how stress modulates
domain-speciﬁc risk sensitivity.
In the domain of mixed gains and losses, previous research on
the relationship between stress and risk sensitivity has also yielded
conﬂicting results. It has been demonstrated that cortisol levels in a
group of male traders in London were signiﬁcantly and positively
correlated with ﬁnancial uncertainty, which was measured by the
variance of economic return and the expected variance of the
market (Coates & Herbert, 2008). Thus, ﬁnancial uncertainty elicits
heightened stress, which may in turn shift individuals' risk pref-
erences. In non-traders, recent research found that individual and
aggregate levels of endogenous cortisol predict subsequent risk-
taking and administered cortisol shifted investment towards
riskier assets (Cueva et al., 2015). Indeed, using a double-blind,
placebo-controlled, cross-over protocol, the same research group
raised cortisol levels in volunteers over eight days and found that
participants became more risk-averse (Kandasamy et al., 2014). It
seems that stress response calibrates risk taking to the circum-
stances, so that individuals avoid risks in times of prolonged un-
certainty, such as a ﬁnancial crisis. Another study found that stress
reduced older adults' but not younger adults' risk taking in a
computer-based driving game (Mather et al., 2009). Thus, stress can
lead to risk aversion at least in some circumstances in elderly.
On the other hand, it is argued that men should be more likely to
take greater risk after stress, analogous to a ‘‘ﬁght’’ response to stress
during competition for territory or other valuable resources, whereas
women should be more likely to be conservative after stress,
avoiding endangerment of the lives of dependent offspring (Taylor
et al., 2000). Consistent with this view, several studies have found
gender differences in response to stress. In one study, acutely
stressed (anticipating a public speech) men were risk-taking,
whereas acutely stressed women were risk-aversive (Preston et al.,
2007). Similar gender by stress results were found in research us-
ing the Balloon Analogue Risk Task inwhich risk taking is associated
with more reward collection (Lighthall et al., 2012; Lighthall et al.,
2009). Exposure to cold pressor stress (immerse a hand for 1 min
into ice water) also increased neural response to the risky decision
task in the dorsal striatum (putamen) and anterior insula among
men, but decreased the response in these regions among women
(Lighthall et al., 2012). In the IGT, the more (salivary) cortisol levels
were elevated after the TSST the poorer the subsequent performance
in the IGT in male subjects, whereas in females, slightly elevated
levels of cortisol after the TSST improved IGT performance and highly
elevated levels decreased IGT performance (van den Bos et al., 2009).
However, a recent study found only a small but non-signiﬁcant
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(Zhang et al., 2011). The inconsistent ﬁndings regarding the effect of
stress on risk taking in males might be due to culture difference
(western vs. eastern), which has not been examined yet.
The complexity of tasks also plays an important role in modu-
lating the effects of stress on decision making strategies. Using the
Game of Dice Task, a decision-making task with explicit and stable
rules that taps both executive functioning and feedback learning, it
was found that stress can lead to disadvantageous decision making
(Starcke et al., 2008). Recent studies showed that stressed partici-
pants in the single-task group made riskier decisions compared
with nonstressed controls, but the effects of stress and a secondary
task cancelled each other out (Pabst et al., 2013a; Gathmann et al.,
2014). The authors interpreted these results as showing that stress
evokes a shift from serial to parallel processing. Thus, task
complexity may determine howmuch executive control is available
for making decisions and thus modulate how stress may inﬂuence
decision-making.
These ﬁndings, taken together, suggest that stress may amplify
risk sensitivity depending on the domain (win/loss), gender, and
task complexity. They indicate that the SIDI model needs to make
more detailed predictions regarding the relationship between
stress and risk sensitivity, taking into account contextual situation
factors and individual differences.
2.2. Diminished cognitive control
People usually generate judgments and attitudes through
automatic processes and then use controlled processes to make
necessary adjustments (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). When ﬁrst
being asked “Is the population of Chicago more or less than
200,000?”, participants automatically anchor their answer on
200,000 when later asked “What is Chicago's population?”.
Adjustment away from self-generated anchors requires the
expenditure of mental effort. If mental resources are diminished,
such ﬁne-tuned adjustments may be compromised, according to
the SIDI model. Indeed, a previous study found that under stress,
individuals were more likely to make decisions before all available
alternatives had been systematically considered, even if no time
constraint for the performance of the task was imposed (Keinan,
1987). This study indicates that stress makes decision makers
more impulsive and more likely to make unexamined responses.
Recently, Kassam et al. found that challenge stress, which in-
dividuals appraise as demanding but manageable, improves
adjustment, whereas threat stress, which individuals perceive as a
situational demand that outweighs resources, reduces adjustment
(Kassam et al., 2009). This study demonstrates that how stress is
perceived (challenge or threat) dictates how it inﬂuences decision
making.
Cognitive control not only inhibits the tendency to make pre-
mature responses but also regulates emotional responses to stim-
uli. A large body of work has shown that responses to emotionally
salient stimuli can be ﬂexibly changed and controlled through
cognitive regulation (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2012). Recruiting cognitive
strategies to deliberately change the way a stimulus is evaluated,
either by reinterpreting (i.e., reappraising) its meaning or focusing
on its more positive aspects, has proven effective at reducing the
subjective, physiological, and neural components of emotional
arousal. It is speciﬁcally under stressful conditions that individuals
may beneﬁt most from such deliberate forms of emotion regula-
tion. However, the SIDI would predict that the efﬁcacy of cognitive
regulation attempts after stress exposure would be reduced due to
the diminished cognitive control ability under stress. Indeed,
regulation training has been shown to produce robust fear reduc-
tion in non-stressed participants but not stressed participants (Raioet al., 2013). A recent neuroimaging study also found that acute
stress impairs self-control in goal-directed choice by reducing
connectivity between ventromedial PFC and dorsolateral PFC re-
gions linked to self-control success (Maier et al., 2015). These re-
sults highlight critical limitations of this technique to control
affective responses under stress; other techniques such as emotion
regulation strategies may also have limited power to overcome
stress-biased decisions. If stress markedly impairs the cognitive
regulation of emotion, it is less likely than individuals can exert
cognitive control to overcome stress induced decision biases.
Another crucial function of cognitive control is to keep in-
dividuals on the track of pursuing goals. In the ever-changing
environment, individuals need to adjust their behaviors according
to the goals they want to accomplish. Such goal-directed ﬂexible
behaviors demand an effortful control and monitoring of the
response. To increase response efﬁciency, recurring decision pro-
cesses can be automated to form a rule or a habit. The goal-directed
system learns action-outcome associations (Dickinson, 1985), and
is believed to be mediated by prefrontal cortex areas and dorso-
medial striatum (Balleine & O'Doherty, 2010). By contrast, the
habitual system learns stimuluseresponse associations regardless
of outcomes, and is supported by posterolateral putamen (Balleine
& O'Doherty, 2010; Yin & Knowlton, 2006). A recent study in
humans showed that stressed individuals continued to perform the
action associatedwith a particular outcome even after this outcome
had been devalued, accompanied by a signiﬁcant decrease in
explicit knowledge of action-outcome contingencies (Schwabe &
Wolf, 2009). The b-adrenoceptor antagonist propranolol, which
blocks the action of adrenaline and noradrenline, blocked this
stress-induced bias toward habit behavior, suggesting that norad-
renergic activation plays a crucial role in such stress elicited deci-
sion strategy switching (Schwabe et al., 2011). Importantly, a
longitudinal assessment of the stressed individuals showed that
both the structural and functional changes triggered by stress are
reversible and that decisions become goal-directed again (Soares
et al., 2012). The link between neuroticism and distress has been
shown to be strong in individuals with high perseverative response
tendency (i.e., less switching across consecutive trials), suggesting a
relationship between distress and response preservation (Robinson
et al., 2006). A recent psychopharmacological study found that
cortisol impaired performance in the cognitive reﬂection test (CRT)
by biasing responses toward intuitive but incorrect answers
(Margittai et al., 2015a). The profound inﬂuence of stress on in-
dividuals' ability to adjust their behavior to changing circumstances
can even be found in infants. Recent evidence showed that 15-mo-
old infants exposed to stress kept performing a previously effective
action, even after the action suddenly became ineffective, sug-
gesting that stressed human infants tend to perform habitual
behavior rigidly (Seehagen et al., 2015). These ﬁndings echo the
well-established stress-induced switching from goal-directed to
habitual control of action in rodents (see a more comprehensive
review in Ref. (Schwabe&Wolf, 2011). Chronic stress caused rats to
become insensitive to changes in outcome value (Graham et al.,
2010), accompanied by atrophy of the medial prefrontal cortex
and caudate and hypertrophy of the putamen (Dias-Ferreira et al.,
2009). Stressed rats also relied more on habit memory rather
than cognitive memory to guide their actions (Elliott & Packard,
2008). Taken together, evidence from both human studies and
animal research point to the possibility that stress biases decision-
making strategies by shifting from goal directed decisions to
habitual choices (Schwabe & Wolf, 2011).
To summarize, previous studies suggest that cognitive control is
diminished under stress, leading to premature decision-making.
Without optimal cognitive control, decision makers are less likely
to do ﬁne-tuned adjustments, exhibit weakened cognitive
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actions. In accord with the SIDI model, stressed individuals are
more likely to fall back to their emotional and habitual responses.
2.3. Social decisions under stress
The deliberation to intuition framework for understanding de-
cision making under stress does not entail the assumption that
stress promotes prosocial or antisocial responses. Rather, it predicts
that stress facilitates spontaneous and innate responses in social
situations. Such responses should be adapted in ancestral human
environments, thus are ‘ecologically rational’ (Hammerstein &
Hagen, 2005; Gigerenzer & Selten, 2002). Rand et al. have shown
that individuals aremore cooperative and altruistic when they have
to make choices quickly under time pressure compared with con-
ditions in which they are given enough time to do analytic calcu-
lation (Rand et al., 2012; Rand et al., 2014). These ﬁndings seem to
suggest that our ﬁrst responses are prosocial actions. However,
whether such a conclusion can be generalized to other social con-
texts awaits further exploration. If individuals' innate tendency is to
cooperate, the SIDI hypothesis would hold that stress promotes
cooperation in social situations. The majority of studies on stress
and prosociality supports this prediction (Buchanan & Preston,
2014), across a range of experimental paradigms. In a study using
the dictator game, responders under social evaluation stress allo-
cated signiﬁcantly more money than controls (Takahashi et al.,
2007). Using the trust game, it was found that male participants
who experienced acute social stress engaged in substantially more
prosocial behavior (trust, trustworthiness, and sharing) compared
with participants in a control condition (von Dawans et al., 2012).
The authors reasoned that stress triggers social approach behavior,
which operates as a potent stress buffering strategy in humans,
thereby providing evidence for the tend-and-befriend hypothesis
and also extend this model to male individuals. Social closeness
also modulate prosocial behaviors in males such that stressed
males only showed increased generosity towards close but not
distant others (Margittai et al., 2015b). Survey results have also
shown that higher levels of acculturative stress are linked to greater
anonymous prosocial tendencies and with fewer costly (altruistic)
prosocial tendencies (McGinley et al., 2010). In the domain of moral
decisions, recent studies using complex moral dilemmas have
shown that persons under stress show signiﬁcantly fewer utili-
tarian responses compared to control subjects (Youssef et al., 2012;
Starcke et al., 2012).
However, contrary to the above ﬁndings that stress promotes
prosocial behaviors, another study found that stress decreased
men's tendency to reject unfair offers in the ultimatum game (UG)
and reduced the amount of money allocated to the other partici-
pant in the dictator game (Vinkers et al., 2013). Research using the
Everyday Moral Decision-Making Task (EMDM), which seeks to
distinguish between altruistic and egotistical behavior, has shown
that the cortisol stress response was associated with egoistic
decision-making in high-emotional situations (Starcke et al., 2011).
These contradictory ﬁndings might be due to differing methods
used to probe prosociality. For example, in the UG, rejecting unfair
offers is usually interpreted as a costly prosocial behavior since
such altruistic punishment costs individuals the potential earning
that they could have otherwise earned (Fehr & Gachter, 2002).
However, they are many social motives may drive such behavior
(Pillutla&Murnighan,1996; Sanfey et al., 2003). Recent studies also
showed that the tendency to reject unfair offers in the UG is not
correlated with individuals' tendencies to exhibit various prosocial
behaviors in other situations (Yamagishi et al., 2012). Also, how
individuals believe they will act in hypothetical moral decision
situations may differ dramatically from how they actually act in thereal world situations (Ajzen et al., 2004; FeldmanHall et al., 2012).
Another possibility is that the link between stress and prosocial
tendency is modulated by social closeness. A recent study found
that men tested 20 min after stressor onset indeed showed
increased generosity towards close but not distant others
compared to non-stressed men or men tested 90 min after stressor
onset (Margittai et al., 2015b). Thus, the proposal tendency elicited
by stress may be limited to close friends or family members but not
extended to strangers. Nevertheless, majority of these ﬁndings do
provide support for the notion that stress leads to prosocial be-
haviors (Buchanan & Preston, 2014).
Stress also inﬂuences individuals' ability to mentalize. In the
beauty contest game, which is designed to measure the depth of
reasoning, participants under stress chose higher numbers than
non-stressed participants, indicating less strategizing (Leder et al.,
2013). In this game, entrants are asked to pick a number between
0 and 100, with the winner of the contest being the person that is
closest to 2/3 the average number picked for all contestants. The
lowest, 'Level 10 players believe that all other players choose
randomly and therefore choose 33 (2/3 of 50). Similarly, Level 2
players would choose 22 (2/3 of 33). The smaller the number
players choose, the higher level of strategic thinking they are. A
recent study found that stress exposure inﬂuences individuals'
mind reading abilities, assessed by Movie for the Assessment of
Social Cognition (MASC). High cortisol responses led to elevated
MASC scores in men but reduced MASC scores among women
(Smeets et al., 2009). These results partially support the idea of sex
differences in biobehavioral stress responses, withmen engaging in
ﬁght-or-ﬂight responses and women showing tending and
befriending behavior (Smeets et al., 2009). The SIDI model may also
explain such a gender difference. It is possible that in certain situ-
ations, the default action for men to respond to threat is to ﬁght
rather than ﬂee. Thus, stress may enhance men's metalizing ability
in order to initiate attack. Overall, there are only few studies
examining the effects of stress on social decisions, although social
decisions are the most important choices we make in our daily life.
The lack of neuroimaging data in this ﬁeld also hinders our un-
derstanding of the neural mechanisms mediating stress and social
decision making.
3. Neural mechanisms for stress induced deliberation-to-
intuition
How human brains respond to stress is a topic that has been
investigated extensively in both animal studies and human
research, see reviews in Refs. (Schwabe & Wolf, 2013; Arnsten,
2009; Roozendaal et al., 2009; Kim & Diamond, 2002). The
stressful event leads to activation of two biological systems: the
autonomic nervous system (ANS), involving release of (nor)
adrenaline, and the hypothalamo-pituitary-adreanal (HPA) axis
(Arnsten, 2009). Immediate fast responses are mostly mediated by
the sympathetic nervous system (SNS) and the associated release of
epinephrine from the adrenal medulla (Joels & Baram, 2009). A
more delayed response-release of cortisol emanates from the ad-
renal cortex (de Kloet et al., 2005; Droste et al., 2008). This is
initiated by neural signals to the hypothalamus, which releases
corticotropin-releasing hormone (CRH), resulting in secretion of
adrenocorticotropic hormone (ACTH) from the anterior pituitary
gland on the bottom of the brain. The ACTH induces cortisol syn-
thesis and release from the adrenal gland. Stress evokes high con-
centrations of catecholamines such as noradrenalin and dopamine,
and an increased concentration of the glucocorticoid cortisol. The
changes of these hormones may alter functioning of neural corre-
lates of decision making, such as the dorsal PFC, ventromedial PFC/
anterior cingulate cortex, striatum, hippocampus, and amygdala.
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support System 1 and System 2 respectively. Stress should enhance
the System 1 intuition related neural activity (e.g., in subcortical
regions) and decrease System 2 reasoning associated brain activity
(e.g., in prefrontal cortex). Here, I selectively review neuroimaging
studies that examine both the prefrontal control system and
subcortical emotional response system in relation to stress.
Previous neuroimaging research has demonstrated a shift in
activity from the newly developed prefrontal cortex to phyloge-
netically older midbrain regions when threat stress draws closer.
Using a Pac-Man like computer game in which volunteers were
pursued by a virtual predator, Mobbs et al. found that as the virtual
predator grew closer, brain activity shifted from the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex to the periaqueductal gray (Mobbs et al., 2007). In
another study, phylogenetic threat was introduced by making
participants believe that a tarantula was placed close to their foot,
and the experience of fear coincided with augmented activity in a
cascade of fear-related brain networks including the peri-
aqueductal gray, amygdala, and bed nucleus, as well as diminished
activity in the orbitofrontal cortex and posterior cingulate cortex
(Mobbs et al., 2010). In a series of studies, social evaluative threat
was also shown to cause activity increases in a more dorsal pre-
genual cingulate region, whose activity was coupled with heart rate
increases; conversely, social evaluative threat caused activity de-
creases in a right ventromedial/medial orbital region, which were
coupled with heart rate increases (Wager et al., 2009; Wager et al.,
2009). Numerous studies have identiﬁed structural and functional
connectivity between prefrontal cortex and amygdala, a key region
in emotion processing (Kim et al., 2011; Kober et al., 2008). Func-
tional coupling between the prefrontal cortex and the key reward
region striatum is also well established (van den Bos et al., 2012;
Haber & Knutson, 2010).
If stress interferes with cognitive systems, it is plausible that
reduced cognitive control ability would lead to an exaggerated
reliance on lower-level automatized systems (Masicampo &
Baumeister, 2008). A recent study, using both PET and fMRI,
demonstrated that in the Montreal Imaging Stress Task (MIST),
stress induced signiﬁcant deactivation of the limbic system
including hippocampus, hypothalamus, medio-orbitofrontal cortex
and ACC in subjects who reacted to the stressor with increased
cortisol (Pruessner et al., 2008). Large-scale network analysis has
provided similar results. In a recent study, responsiveness and
interconnectivity within a network including cortical (frontoin-
sular, dorsal ACC, inferotemporal, and temporoparietal) andFig. 1. The stress induced deliberasubcortical (amygdala, thalamus, hypothalamus, and midbrain)
regions increased during exposure to a fear-related acute stressor
(Hermans et al., 2011). Importantly, b-adrenergic receptor
blockade, but not cortisol synthesis inhibition, diminished the in-
crease, suggesting that the neuromodulator noradrenaline drives
this network reorganization. This study not only identiﬁed two key
networks involved in stress but also highlighted the importance of
the balance between the two networks. Recently, these researchers
proposed that there are two brain networks, salience (e.g.
emotional reactivity) vs. executive control (e.g. working memory),
in governing stress (Hermans et al., 2014). The two stress-related
networks play differential roles in the neurobiology of decision
making under stress and may be analogous to the System 1 and
System 2 framework in the SIDI model.
Taken together, these neuroimaging studies show that stress
diminishes activity in prefrontal cortex and augments activity in
subcortical regions including amygdala, hippocampus, and
midbrain. This activity proﬁle supports the notion that stress
evokes a switch from deliberation that is supported mainly by
prefrontal cortex to intuition that involves phylogenetically older
brain regions such as subcortical areas (see Fig. 1).
4. A stress induced deliberation-to-intuition (SIDI) model
This perspective, referred to as the stress induced deliberation-
to-intuition model, posits that decision making under stress is
inﬂuenced by a combination of immature cognitive control and
heightened intuitive response tendency, which are tied to the
prefrontal reasoning system and the subcortical intuition related
regions. It is acknowledged that not all evidence mentioned above
ﬁts the simple dichotomy the SIDI model assumes. The ﬁndings in
this ﬁeld are often contradictory and complex. For instance, studies
often yield mixed results regarding whether stress increases or
decreases sensitivity to reward. There are several methodological
caveats that may account for such a discrepancy, such as the time
between stress induction and task performance (Schwabe & Wolf,
2014), the number of subjects, and the power of the stress induc-
tion task used (Allen et al., 2014). Moreover, the stress effects are
modulated by age (Galvan & Rahdar, 2013), gender, personalities
(Lempert et al., 2012; Richards et al., 2014), the nature of the
experimental tasks, appraisal of threat (van Wingen et al., 2011),
individuals' basal cortical level, and cortisol responses during stress
(Roelofs et al., 2005). The effects of stress on decision-making are
also multidimensional, ranging from reward/punishmenttion to intuition (SIDI) model.
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tion. Although previous studies tried to isolate these dimensions, it
is worth noting that stress may inﬂuence some or all of these
decision-making stages. However, despite all the factors that
complicate the relationship between stress and decision making, it
is also worth noting that the majority of studies do provide
convergent evidence that stressed individuals are more sensitive to
threat/punishment, less likely to exert cognitive control to examine
their responses, and more prosocial in social contexts. At the neural
level, accumulating evidence suggests that stress diminishes ac-
tivity in the evolutionally new prefrontal cortex and exaggerates
evolution rooted subcortical regions. Thus, both behavioral and
neuroimaging studies so far support the SIDI model, although
further investigation of stress and decision making is urgently
needed.
The SIDI can serve as a simple but useful tool to guide further
research on stress and decision-making. Several hypotheses can be
generated based on the SIDI model. First, a large number of decision
biases are believed to be a result of the imbalance between System
1 and System 2. The SIDI model would predict that stress potenti-
ates these biases. In addition to the several biases mentioned before
(e.g., the framing effect and reﬂection effect), there are many other
biases that should be examined to further test the SIDI model, such
as social conformity (Huang et al., 2014; Asch, 1955), the decoy bias
(Hu& Yu, 2014; Huber et al., 1982), the default bias (Yu et al., 2010),
delay discounting (Yu, 2012; Mischel et al., 1989; Haushofer et al.,
2013; Haushofer & Fehr, 2014), and availability (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974). For example, it is reasonable to predict that in-
dividuals would be more vulnerable to social inﬂuence if they rely
more on System 1 to make decisions, as the SIDI model posits.
Moreover, the SIDI may also predict how stress interacts with
psychiatric disorders such as addiction, depression, and bipolar
mood disorder (Zhang et al., 2011; Deckers et al., 2014). For
example, stress may amplify the decision-making deﬁcits in
addictive patients (Zhang et al., 2011). Stress may also interact with
aging to determine decision making in the elderly, whose pre-
frontal cortex based cognitive control ability is already compro-
mised (Peavy et al., 2009). The SIDI model would also predict that
the effect of stress on decisions should mimic effects found in pa-
tients with prefrontal lesions or individuals after brain stimulation,
which diminishes activity in cognitive control related brain regions.
4.1. Parallel-competitive or default-interventionist
The distinction between deliberative and intuitive systems has
enjoyed considerable popularity in social cognition and decision
making domains (Kahneman, 2011; Evans, 2008; Gilovich et al.,
2002; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Evans, 2003), although it has also
been challenged (Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011). Across different
sub-ﬁelds of psychology, a diverse set of dual-process models have
been proposed, including analytic vs. heuristic (Kahneman, 2011;
Evans, 2008; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Evans, 2003), conscious vs.
unconscious (Dijksterhuis et al., 2006; Lassiter et al., 2009), asso-
ciative versus rule based (Ashby & O'Brien, 2005), goal-directed vs.
habitual (Dickinson, 1985), cognitive vs. affective (Bechara et al.,
1997), and reﬂective (C-system) vs. reﬂexive (X-system) models
(Lieberman, 2007). Recently, there have been discussions about
how stress modulates leaning and decision making through the
lens of duality models. Based on researchwith non-human animals,
Arnsten posited that stress impairs PFC function and strengthens
functionsmediated by amygdala and other subcortical regions, thus
creating a ‘vicious cycle’ (Arnsten, 2009). In response to stress, the
amygdala activates stress pathways in the hypothalamus and
brainstem, which produces high levels of catecholamine release
(e.g. noradrenaline and dopamine). On the one hand, this disruptsthe top-down control by the PFC and allows the bottom-up control
by sensory cortices to be dominating. On the other hand, high levels
of catecholamine strengthen amygdala functioning which biases
individuals towards reﬂexive and habitual responding (Arnsten,
2009). All of these remain plausible hypotheses awaiting further
tests in humans. For example, whether stress always exerts oppo-
site inﬂuence on PFC and amygdala system or stress only alters one
system and leaves the other intact remains to be examined.
Schwabe and Wolf proposed that stress inﬂuences instrumental
behavior by favors habitual over goal-directed memory systems
(Schwabe & Wolf, 2013; Schwabe & Wolf, 2011). Extending previ-
ous these accounts, the current SIDI model is not limited to speciﬁc
forms of decision making (e.g. spatial navigation and instrumental
learning) and attempts to integrate decision parameters encoding,
risk evaluation, cognitive control, and social emotions. The SIDI
model extends these proposals by integrating a range of decision-
making components that allow more precise predictions of
behavior. Importantly, the proposed model describes how the two
systems interact at various stages of processing in a synergistic or
antagonistic fashion. The SIDI model differs from previous accounts
on stress and decision-making on how the two systems interact.
Previous accounts seem to take the parallel-competitive forms of
dual-process theory, based on the notion that two systems work in
parallel and produce two forms of decisions that may lead to
competing attempts to control the behaviors. The SIDI model cor-
responds more closely to the default-interventionist assumption
that intuition system supplies rapid default responses (intuition
proposes) and deliberation system may approve or intervene upon
(deliberation decides) (Evans, 2008). The key differences between
the two approaches relate to the order and dominance of different
cognitive processes. Whether the two systems operate in parallel or
the intuition system is fast and the deliberation is slow to decide
can be tested using high temporal resolution neuroimaging
methods combined with computational models such as granger
causality analysis (Goebel et al., 2003). How the PFC-mediated
deliberation system exerts control over the subcortical-based
intuition system can also be delineated using functional connec-
tivity analysis methods such dynamic causal modeling (Friston
et al., 2003). The challenge for researchers in this ﬁeld is to delin-
eate the exact neuropsychological processes of the switching from
deliberation to intuition system and tease apart factors that
modulate such switching. Neuroimagingmethods can be applied to
elucidate the biopsychological processes of decision making under
stress.
4.2. Arbitration between intuitive and deliberative processes
The arbitrary between intuitive and deliberative responses has
not been directly investigated in the context of stress. One possi-
bility is that there is an arbitrator that keeps track of the degree of
reliability of the two systems and uses this information in order to
proportionately allocate behavioral control. Thus, the arbitrator
modulates both systems. Another possibility is that the arbitrator
deems that the intuition system should be relied on, it allows all
decisions bypass the deliberation processes. In this case, the arbi-
trator modulates only one of the two systems due to reasons of
computational efﬁciency. A recent computational neuroimaging
study provides evidence for the existence in the human brain of an
arbitrator mechanism that determines the extent to which model-
based (goal-directed) and model-free (habitual) learning systems
control behavior (Lee et al., 2014). Lee et al., found that inferior
lateral prefrontal and frontopolar cortex encode both reliability
signals of both systems and the output of a comparison between
those signals, implicating these regions in the arbitration process
(Lee et al., 2014). Importantly, instead of modulating either model-
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reliable estimate, the controller appears to work by selectively
gating the model-free habitual system. Whether stress works in a
similar way in determining which system should control behavior
remain to be examined using computational modelling and neu-
roimaging methods.
4.3. Consequences of intuition are context-dependent
Although some believe that System 2 is superior to System 1 and
always leads to rational decisions, this is not always the case,
especially for experts. For example, the recognition-primed deci-
sionmodel proposes that people use their experience in the form of
patterns (Klein, 1999). These patterns help the decision makers to
recognize the relevant cues, identify plausible goals, and remember
typical types of reactions in certain type of situation. When people
need tomake a decision, they can quickly match the situation to the
patterns they have learned and experienced in the past. Doing this
allows people to successfully make rapid decisions without
comparing options. Thus, if the ﬁrst workable option turns out to be
satisfactory and deliberative analysis does not produce a signiﬁ-
cantly better one, System 1 can produce even better and more
effective outcomes than System 2 (Dijksterhuis et al., 2006; Reyna,
2004; Johnson & Raab, 2003). For example, chess experts rapidly
retrieve a schema that usually provides a solution to the current
problem rather than exhaustively comparing all options (Chase &
Simon, 1973). Intuitive responses are not necessarily associated
with disadvantageous outcomes and more cognitive control is not
always more adaptive. Whether a response or tendency is advan-
tageous or not is context dependent. Risk seeking may be advan-
tageous if the task is structured to favour risk-seeking strategies.
Thus, stress does not necessarily degrade decision quality, and it
can improve decisions in some circumstances. The SIDI model is
agnostic with respect to whether the stress induced changes in
decision making strategies produce desirable or undesirable con-
sequences. Intuitive judgments may turn out to be optimal. It is
worth noting that the SIDI model does not imply that stress is al-
ways detrimental for decision-making. In certain circumstances,
certain levels of stress might be beneﬁcial for decision makers.
Moreover, it might not be obvious that which responses are our
rapid intuitive responses and which are not, especially in social
contexts. Thus, without a clear deﬁnition of what an innate
response is, the argument that stress promotes intuitive processes
is a circular one. More likely than not, innate responses are context
dependent. Humans may have default tendency to be risk taking in
certain situations and be risk aversion in other situations (e.g. the
reﬂection bias). It is arbitrary to simply assign a general tendency
(e.g. risking taking, loss aversion, and prosocial) as the default or an
innate response. Research on stress should be integrated with
studies in which time constraints, physical fatigue, hunger, and
cognitive loads are manipulated in order to better deﬁne what
intuitive responses are. Otherwise, the hypotheses of the SIDI are
derived post-hoc and therefore represent a common factor tomany
stress phenomena.
4.4. Modulators of decision making under stress
First, stress level is a matter of degree. Intuitively, too much as
well as too little stress is often detrimental for cognitive perfor-
mance. In most studies mentioned above, researchers assume that
the elicited stress levels are well above the optimal level. If in-
dividuals reach the ultimatum level of stress that they cannot
handle, theymay crash and give up. Lack of stress, such as boredom
and apathy, may also hinder individuals' performance due to lack of
motivation. Thus, the relationship between he stress level andperformance might be inverted U-shape (Yu, 2015). Second, the
time dependency of cortisol effects might also modulate when and
how stress shapes behaviors. Previous studies have revealed time-
dependent effects on working memory processing, emotional
memory, and brain function in general (Henckens et al., 2011; Joels
et al., 2011). The rapid, non-genomic effects of cortisol in combi-
nation with noradrenaline increase subcortical and decrease pre-
frontal functioning, whereas the aftermath of stress is associated
with upregulated prefrontal functioning (Hermans et al., 2011;
Hermans et al., 2014). The SIDI model applies to the immediate
rapid effect of stress andmaymake opposite predictions for the late
or recovery stage of stress. Third, reaction time was not reported or
discussed in most of previous studies. The SIDI model would pre-
dict that when under time pressure, the greater the psychological
stress, the greater the tendency to make a premature choice (hence
the shorter RT) or seek premature closure. Such hypothesis awaits
future empirical research to test. Fourth, different ways in which
stress is induced in the laboratory (using social evaluation, cold-
pressor tasks, pharmacological methods, and stressful life events)
may also impact the stress effect. For example, cold-presssor tasks
may produce physical challenges whereas social evaluation tasks
may tap more into psychological and social stress, although they all
elevate cortical levels. The difference between acute and chronic
stress should also be taken into consideration. Individuals may
develop various compensatory strategies and coping responses to
deal with stress over a long time period. Environmental factors
such as social support and societal interventions may also play a
role in determining the effects of chronic stress on behaviors.
Finally, individuals' characteristics such as age (Galvan & Rahdar,
2013), gender, and personalities (Lempert et al., 2012; Richards
et al., 2014) may also interact with stress and determine to a
large degree how stress modulates decision-making. Facing similar
stressful events, some may cope well but others may develop
psychological disorders such as anxiety or even posttraumatic
stress disorder (PTSD), depending on individuals' life experience
and personal traits.
At this stage, the distinction between deliberation and intuition
is admittedly rather simplistic. The relationship between stress and
decision making might be quite complicated. It is hard to develop a
model that can explain all existing ﬁndings in the literature given
the complexity of this issue. Despite that the SIDI model may have
oversimpliﬁed the evidence or overlooked inconsistencies in the
literature, the framework offers a useful model for understanding
how stress modulates decision making in humans. Specially, in the
absence of an alternative theoretical account, the SIDI model pro-
vides a useful guideline for the formulation of speciﬁc and testable
hypotheses and an integrated account for the observed effects of
stress on behavioral outcomes and the structural and functional
neural changes in the human brain. There are ﬁndings that run
counter to predictions derived from the SIDI model, suggesting that
more nuanced analyses and theory modiﬁcation are needed. The
SIDI model yields speciﬁc and testable predictions. Future research
may add the detailed quantitative and computational component
into this model. Further speciﬁcation of the model will become
possible as the ﬁeld develops new advanced research methods and
reﬁned ways to integrate behavioral and neuroscientiﬁc sources of
evidence.
5. Concluding remarks
The current review provides an overview of the recent research
on how stress shapes decision-making. Stress may interfere in this
competition between emotion and cognitive functioning and
thereby impair decision-making. The framework presented in this
review serves as a new way to revive the discussion on how stress
R. Yu / Neurobiology of Stress 3 (2016) 83e95 93inﬂuences decisions and may encourage researchers to adopt a
more theory-based and hypothesis-driven approach to their in-
vestigations. Observing some behavior effects of stress in isolation
is not sufﬁcient to allow us to make conclusions about how stress
perpetrates decision-making processes in general. The current re-
view provides a relatively comprehensive summary of stress and
economic decision-making and proposes that stressmay potentiate
decision biases. The stress induced deliberation-to-intuition model
provides testable hypotheses and can guide future research in this
direction. Although what constitutes intuitive decisions is debat-
able, integrating ﬁndings from studies that manipulate reasoning
abilities may inform research on stress and decision-making. This
ﬁeld is still in its infancy and requires more research to fully un-
derstand the phenomenology of decision-making under stress.
Understanding how stress biases decisions would be highly useful
to those people working or living under extreme stress, such as
military soldiers in the war zone, plane pilots, and emergency
responders.
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